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ABSTRACT: We assert that some forms of opportunistic behavior within the organi-
zation are relatively transparent and, therefore, public in nature. Further, while organ-
izations can tightly control such public opportunism, it may not be optimal for them to
do so in the presence of private opportunism. To study how public and private forms
of opportunism differ and interact, we jointly examine budget and effort behavior in a
participative budgeting experiment. We group participants into producer/manager pairs
and set the parameters such that the producer extracts the largest share of surplus
from the manager by publicly setting the budget at zero and privately providing low
effort. When the producer unilaterally sets the budget, the public opportunism of budg-
etary slack is higher and more affected by learning than the private opportunism of low
effort. Giving the manager the power to reject the budget not only reduces budgetary
slack by about 50 percent, but also generates reciprocity expectations and behavior.
In particular, managers who allow more budgetary slack expect and receive higher
effort from their producers on average. This reciprocity increases organizational per-
formance by increasing the expected pay of the manager without decreasing the ex-
pected pay of the producer.
Keywords: opportunism; budgetary slack; effort; learning; reciprocity.
Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
INTRODUCTION
Agrowing number of experiments in management accounting have found that partic-ipants constrain their opportunism, inconsistent with assumptions in agency theory(e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002; Webb 2002; Hannan 2005; Hannan et al.
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2006). There is little experimental research, however, examining characteristics of oppor-
tunism within the organization. We assert that some forms of opportunistic behavior are
relatively transparent and, therefore, public in nature. Further, while organizations can
tightly control such public opportunism, it may not be optimal for them to do so in the
presence of private opportunism. To study how public and private forms of opportunism
differ and interact, we jointly examine budget and effort behavior in a participative budg-
eting experiment. Our results suggest that public and private forms of opportunism may
differ systematically and interact in ways that improve organizational performance. These
results have potential implications for accounting theory and organizational control.
Participative budgeting, whereby subordinates influence the determination of their
budget, is one of the most researched topics in management accounting (Shields and Shields
1998). Argyris (1952) proposed that participative budgeting could improve organizational
performance by increasing goal acceptance and motivation. Schiff and Lewin (1970) as-
serted, however, that managers can best achieve their personal goals with a slack budget
and, thus, are likely to influence the budget process to obtain budgetary slack. Onsi (1973)
found strong support for this assertion, as 80 percent of the middle managers in his sample
stated that they bargained for slack and top managers indicated that they had at least a
‘‘ballpark’’ idea of the slack in their budgets. In a study of profit center managers, Merchant
(1989) found that corporations allowed budgetary slack as a reward for superior
performance.
The ultimate purpose of accounting-based controls such as participative budgeting, from
an organizational perspective, is to improve organizational performance (Hartmann 2000).
In addition to goal-acceptance and increased motivation, participative budgeting can im-
prove organizational performance through information sharing from lower levels of the
organization to upper management (Shields and Shields 1998). To determine if participative
budgeting is optimal for a given organization, these positive effects must be considered in
combination with the dysfunctional effects of budgetary slack and other gaming behavior
(Hartmann 2000). Some researchers have concluded that the gaming behavior associated
with participative budgeting destroys its usefulness (Jensen 2001; Hansen et al. 2003). A
factor that is rarely considered, however, is the possibility that budgetary slack may motivate
increased effort.
We use a participative budgeting experiment to study how public and private forms of
opportunism differ and interact. We group participants into producer/manager pairs and set
the parameters such that the producer extracts the largest share of surplus from the manager
by publicly setting the budget at zero and privately providing low effort. Consistent with
studies showing that budgetary slack can be relatively transparent (e.g., Onsi 1973;
Merchant 1989), we operationalize budgetary slack as a public form of opportunism. Con-
sistent with agency models (e.g., Demski and Feltham 1978; Baiman and Evans 1983;
Penno 1984), we operationalize low effort as a private form of opportunism. In this setting,
we manipulate whether the manager has the power to reject the producer’s budget (Rejection
Power) and whether the producer/manager pairs rotate each period (Pair Rotation). This
allows us to examine whether reciprocity arises under rejection power and whether it in-
creases in multi-period settings. To approach the agency assumption of common knowledge
(Sunder 2002), we give participants extensive experience playing the role of both the pro-
ducer and the manager.
We find systematic differences between public and private forms of opportunism and
interactions between the two that improve organizational performance. When the producer
unilaterally sets the budget, budgetary slack is higher and more affected by learning than
low effort. Giving the manager the power to reject the budget not only reduces budgetary
Public and Private Forms of Opportunism within the Organization 61
Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2008
slack by about 50 percent, but also generates reciprocity expectations and behavior. In
particular, managers who allow more budgetary slack expect and receive higher effort from
their producers on average. This reciprocity increases when producer/manager pairs do not
rotate and the manager is able to establish a reputation over time. Further, this reciprocity
increases organizational performance by increasing the expected pay of the manager without
decreasing the expected pay of the producer.
In a supplemental analysis, we examine the effects of the producer’s concerns for
fairness and ethics on our public and private forms of opportunism. While fairness concerns
reduce both budgetary slack and low effort, ethical concerns reduce low effort only. The
insignificant relation between ethical concerns and budgetary slack, which is inconsistent
with results in Stevens (2002), is likely due to the learning effects we observe for budgetary
slack. That is, participants observe high budgetary slack as managers and thereby come to
view budgetary slack as a ‘‘social norm.’’ Our fairness and ethics results, however, must be
interpreted with care as they are based on two questions in the exit questionnaire.
The results of this study have potential implications for management accounting theory
and organizational control. Traditional agency theory, on which much of management ac-
counting theory is based, assumes that public opportunism will be tightly controlled and
that private opportunism will be fully exploited. In our study, however, managers allow
significant public opportunism and producers reciprocate by constraining their private op-
portunism. This reciprocity generates a higher expected pay for the manager without re-
ducing the expected pay for the producer. These results suggest that management accounting
theory may be enhanced by incorporating public forms of opportunism and the potential
interaction between public and private opportunism. These results also suggest that it may
not be optimal for organizations to tightly control public opportunism in the presence of
private opportunism. In participative budgeting settings, for example, a more flexible, profit-
conscious approach to the budget may be optimal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section we develop
our hypotheses using the traditional principal-agent framework. In the third section we
explain our experimental procedures. Manipulation checks and test results are presented in
the fourth section. The paper concludes with our summary and conclusions.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
To develop our hypotheses and motivate our experimental design, we draw from the
traditional principal-agent framework (see Baiman 1982; Eisenhardt 1989; Baiman 1990;
Covaleski et al. 2003). In this framework, a risk-neutral principal hires a risk- and effort-
averse agent to provide a productive effort. The outcome of the productive effort is affected
by the level of effort provided by the agent, which is unobservable to the principal, and
random factors beyond the agent’s control. Because he is opportunistic and his effort is
unobservable, the agent will shirk and provide far less than the optimal level of effort after
contracting with the principal. From the traditional principal-agent framework, therefore,
the opportunistic behavior of low effort arises because of three factors: (1) information
asymmetry between the principal and the agent regarding the agent’s effort, (2) uncertainty
in the relation between effort and production, and (3) the agent’s characteristics of risk
aversion, effort aversion, and self-interested opportunism.
Demski and Feltham (1978) examine why budget-based contracts might emerge as a
dominant solution within the traditional principal-agent framework. In their analysis, they
incorporate the possibility of contracts that pay the agent a basic wage if production is
below the budget and the wage plus a bonus if production is above the budget. Demski
and Feltham (1978) show that for a budget-based contract to be optimal, the agent must
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be risk-averse and effort must be unobservable or costly to observe. Given that a pure salary
contract is incapable of inducing any effort from the agent in the traditional principal-agent
framework, Demski and Feltham (1978) compare budget-based contracts with pure piece-
rate contracts. They find that budget-based contracts can emerge as a dominant solution
because the agent bears no risk for receiving the wage and yet is motivated to provide
effort to acquire the bonus.
Principal-agent models in Baiman and Evans (1983) and Penno (1984) demonstrate
how participative budgeting can emerge as a dominant solution in this setting. These models
incorporate a private signal observed by the agent regarding the relation between effort and
production, and show that participative budgeting can create a Pareto improvement by
allowing the agent to communicate his private information to the principal. Participative
budgeting, however, generates a new incentive problem. If the budget is used to evaluate
subsequent performance, then the agent is motivated to bias the information to obtain a
budget that is easier to attain. That is, the agent is motivated to influence the budget to
create budgetary slack.
The traditional principal-agent framework demonstrates the potential existence of two
forms of opportunistic behavior within the participative budgeting setting. To improve or-
ganizational planning and performance, the principal would prefer that the agent reveal his
private information in the budget and provide high effort. All else held constant, however,
a risk-averse and effort-averse agent would prefer to build slack into the budget and provide
low effort. Thus, budgetary slack and low effort represent two forms of opportunistic be-
havior on the part of the agent. As reflected in the empirical literature, however, budgetary
slack can be a relatively public form of opportunism (Onsi 1973; Merchant 1989).
To study public and private forms of opportunism within the organization, we design
a participative budgeting experiment that accentuates the public nature of the budget de-
cision and the private nature of the effort decision. We group participants into producer/
manager pairs where the manager pays the producer to provide a productive effort using a
slack-inducing pay scheme. The producer publicly presents a production budget to the
manager and then privately chooses his effort. The production outcome can take one of
two values and the probability of the higher value increases when the producer chooses
high effort rather than low effort. Finally, the experimental parameters assure that the pro-
ducer extracts the largest share of surplus from the manager by setting the budget at zero
and providing low effort. Because participants receive extensive experience in both roles,
expected performance is common knowledge and budgetary slack is relatively easy to
detect. Even with extensive experience, however, low effort remains difficult to detect.
Jointly examining both public and private opportunism allows us to test potential dif-
ferences and interactions between these two forms of opportunism. Traditional agency the-
ory is silent regarding such effects because it assumes that all public opportunism will be
tightly controlled and all private opportunism will be fully exploited. Recent game theory
and related experimental evidence, however, suggests that agents constrain their opportun-
ism to achieve fair outcomes (Bicchieri 2006). Frequently cited game theory models of
fairness and reciprocity include Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Rabin’s (1993)
model captures the notion that people are motivated to be kind to kind persons and unkind
to unkind persons. Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model captures the notion that people are
uneasy about unequal distributions, even if they personally benefit. While early experimen-
tal studies documented behavior consistent with fairness and reciprocity preferences, recent
evidence suggests that these preferences are dependent on social context and framing
(Bicchieri 2006; Cox and Deck 2005).
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Similar to Fisher et al. (2000), we manipulate the rejection power of the manager.
When the manager cannot reject the budget, the setting resembles a Dictator game where
one of two participants proposes the split of a pool of money. Dictator games have been
widely used to test the presence of individual norms for fairness, ethics, etc. (Bicchieri
2006). Including a setting without rejection power, therefore, allows us to observe baseline
levels of budgetary slack and low effort that may reflect the producer’s norms for fairness
or ethics. This setting also allows us to examine fundamental differences between budget
and effort behavior that may arise due to the pubic versus private nature of these two forms
of opportunism. Finally, this setting allows us to test incremental effects of giving the
manager the power to reject the budget.
When the manager can reject the producer’s budget, the setting resembles an Ultimatum
game where the proposed split can be rejected by the other participant. This setting allows
us to test the emergence of reciprocity between the manager and the producer. Absent
reciprocity expectations, the optimal strategy for the manager is to tightly control the public
opportunism of budgetary slack by her/his rejection decisions. Game theory and related
experimental evidence suggest, however, that the presence of the private opportunism of
low effort will cause reciprocity to arise between the manager and the producer. In partic-
ular, we expect the manager to allow budgetary slack to induce the producer to provide
high effort. Similar to Hannan’s (2005) experiment documenting a positive relation between
salary and employee effort, we expect participants to view this setting as a gift exchange
whereby more slack is granted in exchange for higher effort. This expectation is stated
formally in our first hypothesis:
H1: Ceteris paribus, reciprocity will arise when managers have the ability to reject the
producer’s budget whereby the manager allows more budgetary slack in exchange
for higher effort.
Previous experiments have shown that strategic behavior such as reciprocity is more
likely to arise when participants interact over multiple periods (Dopuch et al. 2001). This
effect is attributable to expectation formation and reputation building. In our setting, re-
peated interaction gives the manager the opportunity to establish a reputation for allowing
high budgetary slack over time. This reputation for allowing high slack will likely convey
kindness and trust to the producer, and thereby encourage high effort from the producer in
return. Thus, all else held constant, we expect the reciprocity that arises under rejection
power to be greater when producer/manager pairs stay together over multiple periods. This
expectation is stated formally in our second hypothesis:
H2: Ceteris paribus, the reciprocity that arises when managers have the ability to reject
the producer’s budget will be greater when producer/manager pairs stay together
over multiple periods.
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
We test our hypotheses using a participative budgeting experiment. We conducted eight
experimental sessions via networked computer terminals at a PAC-Ten university using 96
volunteer participants from full-time M.B.A. classes. Each experimental session included
12 participants (6 pairs) and lasted approximately two-and-a-half hours. Each session began
with a testing and instruction phase where participants completed a portion of the Jackson
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FIGURE 1
Timeline of Events in Each Decision Period
(1)
- Producer submits the
production budget
- Producer privately
selects an effort level
(high or low)
(2)
- Manager views the
production budget
- Manager submits a
forecast of effort
- Manager decides
whether or not to reject
the budget (if rejection
power is present)
(3)
- Production level is
determined through a
random draw (unless the
budget is rejected)
- Pay for the period is
determined and
disclosed (except for
forecast earnings, which
are disclosed in total
after 10+ periods)
Personality Inventory (JPI-R; Jackson 1994) and read through the instructions to the ex-
periment. Next, participants completed the budgeting and production phase during which
they made decisions as producers and managers of an organization. At the end of the
experimental session participants completed an exit questionnaire and received their cash
earnings in private.
The experimental manipulations formed a two-treatment split-plot factorial design (Kirk
1982). The rejection power and pair rotation manipulations were fully crossed on a between-
participants basis. In addition, the design incorporated a within-participants experience ma-
nipulation. In each experimental session, participants played one role (producer or manager)
for a minimum of ten periods and then switched and played the other role for a minimum
of ten periods. The process then repeated, so there were four decision series with at least
40 decision periods in each experimental session and each participant provided an inex-
perienced and experienced set of observations for each role. The actual number of decision
periods in each of the four decision series was determined by a random draw. After ten
production periods, there was a 50 percent probability of continuing at the end of a given
period.1 In all experimental conditions, the producer/manager pairs were randomly rotated
when participants switched roles for the next decision series. This feature controlled for
retaliation strategies across decision series.
A timeline of events in each decision period appears in Figure 1. At the beginning of
each period the producer submitted a production budget to the manager and then privately
selected an effort level (high or low).2 Each effort level imposed an economic cost on the
producer, with high effort costing more and generating higher expected production than
low effort. This captured the concept of effort in agency theory in that, (1) the producer
privately provided the effort, (2) an increase in effort increased expected production, and
1 A stochastically determined endpoint is commonly used in experimental economics studies to approximate an
infinite time horizon and minimize backward-induction solutions.
2 Because the producer privately selected the level of effort at the beginning of the decision period, the effort
choice of the producer was made prior to the rejection choice of the manager in the rejection power condition.
This design choice has implications for the pair rotation condition under rejection power, as we discuss in the
results section.
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(3) the producer derived increasing disutility from the effort. To measure effort expectations
of the manager, we gathered a cash-motivated forecast of effort from the manager each
period before actual production was determined.
The production distributions for the two effort levels are presented below:
The Relation between Effort (X) and Production (y)
Value of y Pr (yX  Low) Pr (yX  High)
4 2/3 1/3
10 1/3 2/3
E(y) 6 8
This table reflects how the expected production for each effort level was created by altering
the probabilities of achieving a low production outcome of 4 units and a high production
outcome of 10 units. The table also shows that expected production under low effort was
6 units and expected production under high effort was 8 units. Note that a low or high
production outcome was possible under both effort levels, so the production outcome did
not reveal the producer’s effort in a given period. Providing low effort cost the producer
$0.05 and providing high effort cost $0.20.3
A slack-inducing pay scheme was used to compensate the producer each production
period as follows:
P  $0.60  ($0.05)(y  y), if y  y (1)
 $0.60, if y  y
where P is the producer’s gross pay for a given production period and y and y are the
producer’s self-set budget and actual production, respectively. This pay scheme paid a fixed
salary of $0.60 plus a bonus of $0.05 for each unit produced beyond the budget. This pay
was reduced by the producer’s cost of effort for the period ($0.05 for low effort or $0.20
for high effort).
The manager received a return on the production outcome each period as follows:
R  $0.20y  P (2)
where R is the manager’s return and P is the producer’s gross pay from the pay scheme
(without the cost of effort subtracted). This return included a piece rate of $0.20, which is
15 cents higher than the bonus paid the producer for each unit produced beyond the budget.
The manager also received $0.20 in each period that she/he accurately forecasted the effort
provided by the producer. To keep the effort decisions of the producer private within a
given decision series, forecast earnings were not disclosed to the manager until the end of
each decision series and then only in total.
The expected payoffs for the producer and manager at each budget and effort level
were presented to participants in a format similar to Table 1. The parameters were selected
so that the following characteristics were present:
3 All monetary amounts presented in this section were multiplied by 100 experimental dollars when presented to
participants in the experiment.
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TABLE 1
Expected Payoffs under Various Effort and Budget Levels
Low Effort:
Cost to Producer  $0.05
Production Probability: Pr(4)  2/3 and Pr(10)  1/3
Expected Production  6 units
Budget
Producer Paya
Prod  4 Prod  10 Expectedc
Manager Payb
Prod  4 Prod  10 Expectedc
0 $0.75 $1.05 $0.85 $0.00 $0.90 $0.30
1 $0.70 $1.00 $0.80 $0.05 $0.95 $0.35
2 $0.65 $0.95 $0.75 $0.10 $1.00 $0.40
3 $0.60 $0.90 $0.70 $0.15 $1.05 $0.45
4 $0.55 $0.85 $0.65 $0.20 $1.10 $0.50
5 $0.55 $0.80 $0.63 $0.20 $1.15 $0.52
6 $0.55 $0.75 $0.62 $0.20 $1.20 $0.53
7 $0.55 $0.70 $0.60 $0.20 $1.25 $0.55
8 $0.55 $0.65 $0.58 $0.20 $1.30 $0.57
9 $0.55 $0.60 $0.57 $0.20 $1.35 $0.58
10 $0.55 $0.55 $0.55 $0.20 $1.40 $0.60
High Effort:
Cost to Producer  $0.20
Production Probability: Pr(4)  1/3 and Pr(10)  2/3
Expected Production  8 units
Budget
Producer Pay
Prod  4 Prod  10 Expected
Manager Pay
Prod  4 Prod  10 Expected
0 $0.60 $0.90 $0.80 $0.00 $0.90 $0.60
1 $0.55 $0.85 $0.75 $0.05 $0.95 $0.65
2 $0.50 $0.80 $0.70 $0.10 $1.00 $0.70
3 $0.45 $0.75 $0.65 $0.15 $1.05 $0.75
4 $0.40 $0.70 $0.60 $0.20 $1.10 $0.80
5 $0.40 $0.65 $0.57 $0.20 $1.15 $0.83
6 $0.40 $0.60 $0.53 $0.20 $1.20 $0.87
7 $0.40 $0.55 $0.50 $0.20 $1.25 $0.90
8 $0.40 $0.50 $0.47 $0.20 $1.30 $0.93
9 $0.40 $0.45 $0.43 $0.20 $1.35 $0.97
10 $0.40 $0.40 $0.40 $0.20 $1.40 $1.00
a Producer Pay: Pay given to the producer in a given production period based on the following formula: ($0.60
Fixed Salary)  ($0.05  Production above Budget) – (Cost of Effort).
b Manager Pay: Pay given to the manager in a given production period based on the following formula: ($0.20
 Production) – (Producer Pay – Cost of Effort).
c Expected Pay: The average pay that the producer or manager could expect over the long-term given the
payments and probabilities for each production level. Example: In the first row the expected pay of the
producer is ($0.75  2 /3)  ($1.05  1 /3)  $0.85 and the expected pay of the manager is ($0.00  2 /3)
 ($0.90  1 /3)  $0.30.
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(1) At all effort and production levels, the budget level that maximized the expected
pay of the producer was zero.
(2) At all effort and production levels, the budget level that maximized the expected
pay of the manager was 10.
(3) At all budget and production levels, the effort level that maximized the expected
pay of the producer was low effort.
(4) At all budget and production levels, the effort level that maximized the expected
pay of the manager was high effort.
(5) The total expected pay to the producer and manager combined was higher under
high effort ($1.40) than under low effort ($1.15).
The first four characteristics assured that the classic agency conflict was present. That
is, the manager benefited most from a high budget (10) and high effort, but the producer
was motivated to set the budget at zero and provide low effort. The fifth characteristic
assured that overall organizational performance was higher under high effort and, therefore,
it was always in the best interest of the manager to induce high effort from the producer.
The rejection power of the manager was manipulated in the following manner. In one
condition the manager had to accept the budget presented by the producer and in the
other condition the manager could reject the budget before the production draw. To make
rejection a credible threat, both the producer and the manager received $0.50 when the
budget was rejected, which represented the opportunity costs from the labor and capital
markets, respectively. As reflected in Table 1, under low effort it is optimal for the manager
to reject any budget below 4 as such budgets provide expected pay less than $0.50. Under
rejection power and the assumption of unconstrained opportunism, therefore, the predicted
outcome is low effort and a budget of four.4 Unconstrained opportunism yields this predic-
tion because an opportunistic producer would always provide low effort and set the budget
at the lowest possible level in this setting.
The rotation of producer/manager pairs was manipulated in the following manner. In
the no rotation condition the producer/manager pairs remained the same for all periods
within a given decision series. In the rotation condition each participant was randomly
paired with a new partner after each decision period within a given decision series. As
mentioned previously, each participant was randomly paired with a new partner between
each of the four decision series regardless of the rotation condition.
At the end of the experiment, participants privately received their earnings in cash.5
Participants also received a $5 payment for arriving on time and participating in the ex-
periment. The total expected cash payment was approximately $25 per participant and
actual payments ranged from $11 to $30 for the two-and-a-half hour experiment.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
The exit questionnaire contained a number of statements designed to test the effective-
ness of experimental controls and manipulations. Participants responded to these statements
on a Likert scale from 1 ‘‘Strongly Disagree’’ to 7 ‘‘Strongly Agree.’’ The manipulation
4 Given our measure of budgetary slack, which is expected production less the producer’s self-set budget all divided
by expected production, the unconstrained opportunism prediction (low effort and a budget of four) yields budg-
etary slack of 2 /6  331⁄3%.
5 Total experimental dollar earnings were converted to U.S. dollars at a rate of 1 experimental dollar  U.S.$0.005.
As mentioned in footnote 3, all monetary amounts presented in this paper were multiplied by 100 experimental
dollars when presented to participants in the experiment.
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checks involve tests of mean differences from the neutral response of 4. Participants cor-
rectly agreed (p  0.01) that the number of units produced in a given decision period was
affected by the effort level provided by the producer (mean response 5.75, SD  1.78) and
that the producer/manager pairs were randomly rotated between each decision series (mean
response 5.68, SD  1.84). Participants also correctly agreed (p  0.01) that the incentive
scheme encouraged the producer to set a budget that was below the expected level of
production (mean response 6.01, SD  1.47) and to provide a low level of effort (mean
response 5.81, SD  1.75). These responses suggest that participants correctly perceived
the economic incentive for producers to set low budgets and provide low effort.
The following two statements were included in the exit questionnaire to determine
whether participants perceived that the effort decision was private in nature:
10. ‘‘While playing the role of the manager, I was given the effort level provided by
the producer each period.’’
11. ‘‘While playing the role of the manager, I was eventually able to infer the effort
level provided by the producer over time through the production outcomes.’’
The mean response to Statement #10 was 1.81 (SD  1.73), which is significantly
different from 4 (p  0.01) and confirms that the participants perceived that the effort
decision was not revealed to the manager. The mean response to Statement #11 was 4.81
(SD  2.01) and, while significantly different from 4 at the 0.05 level, suggests that par-
ticipants had difficulty inferring the effort level of the producer over time. This is further
evidenced by the fact that average forecast accuracy was only 58.7 percent overall. Inter-
estingly, the response to Statement #11 does not differ between participants in the no
rotation and rotation conditions, suggesting that repeated interactions did not improve the
manager’s ability to infer the effort of the producer. These responses suggest that the private
nature of the effort decision was successfully maintained in the experiment.
The following two statements were included in the exit questionnaire as a manipulation
check for the rejection and rotation manipulations:
7. ‘‘In each production period, the manager could reject the budget submitted by the
producer if it was too low.’’
9. ‘‘After each production period within a series, I was given a new partner to interact
with.’’
The mean response to Statement #7 was 1.65 (SD  1.47) for participants in the no
rejection condition and 6.02 (SD  1.63) for participants in the rejection condition. The
mean response to Statement #9 was 2.15 (SD  2.07) for participants in the no rotation
condition and 5.94 (SD  1.54) for participants in the rotation condition. Each of these
mean responses are significantly different from the neutral response of 4 (p  0.01) and
are in the correct direction, suggesting that the rejection and rotation manipulations were
successful.
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Results
Figure 2 contains a graph of the mean budgetary slack in each of the four experimental
groups across the first ten periods of the four decision series (40 decision periods). Similar
to prior experimental studies (e.g., Young 1985; Waller 1988; Chow et al. 1988; Chow et
al. 1991; Fisher et al. 2000, Stevens 2002, Webb 2002), we measure budgetary slack as the
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FIGURE 2
Mean Budgetary Slack in Each Decision Period
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producer’s expected performance minus the self-set budget all divided by expected per-
formance.6 Figure 2 yields four preliminary observations. First, producers in the two no
rejection power groups learned to build substantial slack into their budget over time, but
did not converge to the unconstrained opportunism prediction of 100 percent. Second,
producers in the two rejection power groups tested the upper limits for slack in the early
periods of each decision series, but ended up with about half as much budgetary slack as
6 Because the producer made the budget and effort decision prior to the manager’s rejection decision under rejection
power, budgetary slack and effort observations are available even when the budget is rejected by the manager.
Under rejection power, budgets were rejected 34 percent of the time when producer /manager pairs stayed together
and 31 percent of the time when producer /manager pairs rotated each period within a decision series. These
rates are insignificantly different (p  0.10). The results we present include budgetary slack and effort obser-
vations from periods when the budget was rejected. When such observations are excluded, however, the results
are qualitatively the same.
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FIGURE 3
Mean Percent of Low Effort Provided in Each Decision Period
39373533312927252321191715131197531
Lo
w
Ef
fo
rt
Pr
o
vid
ed
1.0
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
0.0
Experimental Groups:
No manager rejection power; no producer/manager pair rotation
No manager rejection power; producer/manager pair rotation
Manager rejection power; no producer/manager pair rotation
Manager rejection power; producer/manager pair rotation
the no rejection power groups. Third, of the producers in the two rejection power groups,
those under the no pair rotation condition exhibited higher slack than those under the pair
rotation condition. Fourth, managers in the two rejection power groups tolerated relatively
high levels of budgetary slack, averaging approximately 40 percent. In comparison, the
unconstrained opportunism prediction under rejection power of low effort and a budget of
four yields budgetary slack of 2/6  331⁄3 percent.
Figure 3 contains a graph of the mean percent of low effort provided in each of the
four experimental conditions across the 40 decision periods. The figure reveals no obvious
trend for this private form of opportunism, in stark contrast to the public opportunism of
budgetary slack. Further, this graph reveals high variability in effort behavior. Finally, as
with budgetary slack, the percent of low effort provided did not converge to the uncon-
strained opportunism prediction of 100 percent for any of the four experimental conditions.
Table 2 presents the mean budgetary slack and low effort percentage by rejection power
and experience. We collapse the pair rotation condition in this table to focus on differential
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TABLE 2
Mean Budgetary Slack and Low Effort Percentage by Rejection Power and Experience
(standard deviations appear in parentheses)
Rejection Powera
Condition
Experienced Producerb Condition
Inexperienced Experienced
Observations 48 48
No Rejection Power Slack%c 82.1 (28.1) 91.4 (22.8)
Low Effort%d 67.9 (30.5) 66.9 (35.3)
Observations 48 48
Rejection Power Slack% 38.3 (19.2) 40.1 (26.1)
Low Effort% 69.4 (30.1) 58.5 (35.7)
a Rejection Power: When present, the manager had the power to reject the budget submitted by the producer.
b Experienced Producer: Inexperienced producer decision series (1st ten decision periods as producer) versus
experienced producer decision series (2nd ten decision periods as producer).
c Slack%: Expected production less the producer’s self-set budget all divided by expected production.
d Low Effort%: The percent of time producers provided low effort in a production series.
learning effects. Under no rejection power, experience caused budgetary slack to marginally
increase in magnitude from 82.1 to 91.4 percent (two-tailed p  0.078) and significantly
decrease in variance (p  0.01). This suggests a learning effect for budgetary slack, con-
sistent with Figure 2. In contrast, experience left low effort percentage relatively unchanged
under no rejection power (67.9 and 66.9 percent, respectively; two-tailed p  0.10) and
caused a marginal increase in variance (p  0.088). Under rejection power, budgetary slack
was cut in half and remained fairly constant at 38.3 and 40.1 percent (two-tailed p  0.10)
under the two experience conditions, respectively. Interestingly, experience led producers
to marginally reduce their average low effort from 69.4 to 58.5 percent under the rejection
power condition (two-tailed p  0.111). This result is examined more fully below.
Consistent with prior experimental studies, the participants in our study did not exhibit
unconstrained opportunism. To examine this result more fully, we present opportunism
strategies used by producers in Table 3. We categorize participants as having a high public
opportunism strategy if they set budgetary slack greater than 80 percent on average (a
budget  1 under either high or low effort) and as having a high private opportunism
strategy if they provided low effort greater than 80 percent of the time.7 We categorize
participants as having a full opportunism strategy if they exhibit both high public and high
private opportunism. Table 3 shows that participants were only able to implement a full
opportunism strategy in the no rejection power condition, and that the percent of producers
exhibiting a full opportunism strategy in this condition increased from 31 to 48 percent
with experience. Producers exhibited the lowest incidence of opportunism under rejection
power, as expected. However, while the threat of rejection kept public opportunism at a
minimum of 2 and 4 percent, respectively, private opportunism actually decreased from 42
to 31 percent with experience.
7 We chose  80 percent budgetary slack as the cut-off for high public opportunism because it captures all settings
where the producer averaged a budget of one or less. An average budget of one or less is significantly below
the expected production of six and eight under low and high effort, respectively, and provides some allowance
for error. We chose  80 percent low effort as the cut-off for high private opportunism to match the cut-off for
high public opportunism. As with all cut-offs used to categorize behavior, these cut-offs are somewhat arbitrary.
For our purposes here, however, they appear reasonable. Changing the cut-offs by 10 percent alters the com-
parative percentages slightly, as expected, but does not alter the overall conclusions gleaned from Table 3.
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TABLE 3
Opportunism Strategies by Rejection Power and Experience
Rejection Powera
Condition
Experienced Producerb Condition
Inexperienced Experienced
Fullc 31% 48%
No Rejection Power Public Onlyd 38% 42%
Private Onlye 4% 0%
Other f 27% 10%
Full 0% 0%
Rejection Power Public Only 2% 4%
Private Only 42% 31%
Other 56% 65%
a Rejection Power: When present, the manager had the power to reject the budget submitted by the producer.
b Experienced Producer: Inexperienced producer decision series (1st ten decision periods as producer) versus
experienced producer decision series (2nd ten decision periods as producer).
c Full: Percent of producers exhibiting a full opportunism strategy as evidenced by setting average slack  80
percent and providing low effort  80 percent of the time.
d Public Only: Percent of producers exhibiting a public opportunism only strategy as evidenced by setting
average slack  80 percent and providing low effort  80 percent of the time.
e Private Only: Percent of producers exhibiting a private opportunism only strategy as evidenced by setting
average slack  80 percent and providing low effort  80 percent of the time.
f Other: Percent of producers exhibiting none of the aforementioned opportunism strategies as evidenced by
setting average slack  80 percent and providing low effort  80 percent of the time.
In summary, these descriptive statistics and preliminary results suggest the following.
Under the baseline condition of no rejection power, there is evidence of a differential
learning effect between the two forms of opportunism. With experience, budgetary slack
increased in magnitude and decreased in variance whereas low effort remained relatively
constant in magnitude and marginally increased in variance. The learning effect for budg-
etary slack likely occurred because the public nature of the budget decision led participants
to form a social norm for high slack over time. No such social norm could form with the
effort decision because of its private nature. Yet, despite the private nature of the effort
decision, producers demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice the 15 cents in a given period
to provide high effort rather than low effort. Under the rejection power condition, budgetary
slack remained relatively constant at about half the level of the no rejection condition,
whereas low effort tended to decrease with experience. Next, we explore the budget and
effort outcomes under the rejection power condition in more detail and test our main hy-
potheses. We conclude this results section by providing a supplemental analysis of the
effects of fairness and ethical concerns using the full sample.
Results of Hypothesis Tests
Our first hypothesis predicts that reciprocity will arise under rejection power whereby
the manager allows more budgetary slack in exchange for higher effort. As mentioned
previously, the parameters of the experiment assured that the manager’s expected pay was
always maximized when the producer provided high effort. This allowed reciprocity to
emerge as a dominant strategy in our experimental setting. To see this, recall that the
unconstrained opportunism prediction under rejection power is low effort and a budget of
4 (budgetary slack  331⁄3 percent). Table 1 shows that this prediction provides the producer
with an expected pay of $0.65 and the manager with an expected pay of $0.50. Under high
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effort, however, the manager’s expected pay ranges from $0.60 to $1.00, so it is always in
the manager’s best interest to induce the producer to provide high effort by allowing more
budgetary slack (i.e., budgetary slack  331⁄3 percent).
Evidence that managers implemented a reciprocity strategy can be found by examining
the relation between budgetary slack allowed and the managers’ cash motivated forecasts
of effort. Untabulated Pearson correlation statistics reveal a strong positive association be-
tween budgetary slack allowed (based on expected production from the manager’s fore-
casted effort) and the manager’s forecast of high effort (0.413, two-tailed p  0.01). This
suggests that managers who allowed higher budgetary slack expected their producer to
reciprocate by providing high effort. There is also a positive association between the pro-
ducer’s actual budgetary slack and the manager’s forecast of high effort (0.231, two-tailed
p  0.05). This evidence supports H1.
Evidence that managers implemented a reciprocity strategy under rejection power can
also be found by examining expected producer and manager pay. The budgetary slack of
39.2 percent and low effort percentage of 64.0 under the rejection power condition yielded
an expected pay of $0.654 and $0.588 to the producer and manager, respectively. The
expected producer pay of $0.654 is essentially identical to the unconstrained opportunism
prediction of $0.65 but the expected manager pay of $0.588 is significantly higher than the
unconstrained opportunism prediction of $0.50 (two-tailed p  0.01). The expected total
pay of $1.242 is also significantly higher than the unconstrained opportunism prediction of
$1.15 (two-tailed p  0.01). This suggests that managers successfully induced higher effort
from producers by allowing more budgetary slack, and this reciprocity allowed the manager
to realize a higher expected pay without reducing the expected pay of the producer. This
provides further support for H1.
Our second hypothesis predicts that the reciprocity that arises under rejection power
will be greater when producer/manager pairs stay together over multiple periods. Under
rejection power, mean budgetary slack is 43.4 percent when pairs stay together within a
decision series and 35.0 percent when pairs rotate, whereas mean low effort percentage is
58.1 when pairs stay together and 69.8 when pairs rotate. These differences are significantly
different at the 0.05 level (one-tailed tests), suggesting that reciprocity is greater when pairs
stay together as predicted. This increased reciprocity also increased expected total pay for
the two parties. Under rejection power the mean expected pay of the producer and manager
is $0.665 and $0.592 when pairs stay together and $0.643 and $0.584, respectively, when
pairs rotate. Thus, under the rejection power condition total expected pay increased on
average from $1.227 to $1.257 (one-tailed p  0.05) when pairs stayed together. This
evidence supports H2.
To further explore these reciprocity results, we present the reciprocity outcomes under
rejection power by pair rotation and experience conditions in Table 4. This table shows that
the highest level of reciprocity occurred in the No Rotation/Experienced condition. The
budgetary slack of 45.6 percent and low effort percentage of 52.5 in this condition yielded
an expected pay of $0.670 and $0.603 to the producers and managers, respectively, for an
expected total pay of $1.273. Again, the expected manager pay of $0.603 is significantly
higher than the unconstrained opportunism prediction of $0.50 and the expected total pay
of $1.273 is significantly higher than the unconstrained opportunism prediction of $1.15
(both two-tailed p  0.01).
Interestingly, Table 4 reveals that expected manager pay for the experienced decision
series was essentially the same under the rotation and no rotation conditions ($0.604 versus
$0.603, respectively). Thus, although managers in the no rotation condition demonstrated
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TABLE 4
Reciprocity Outcomes under Rejection Power by Pair Rotation and Experience
(standard deviations appear in parentheses)
Pair Rotationa
Condition
Experienced Producerb Condition
Inexperienced Experienced
Observations 24 24
Slack%c 35.3 (19.1) 34.7 (19.1)
Low Effort%d 75.0 (31.9) 64.6 (37.4)
Rotation Exp Prod Paye $0.649 (0.050) $0.637 (0.053)
Exp Mgr Payf $0.564 (0.102) $0.604 (0.121)
Exp Total Payg $1.213 (0.080) $1.241 (0.095)
Observations 24 24
Slack% 41.3 (19.2) 45.6 (31.0)
No Rotation Low Effort% 63.8 (27.6) 52.5 (33.7)
Exp Prod Pay $0.661 (0.041) $0.670 (0.055)
Exp Mgr Pay $0.580 (0.084) $0.603 (0.075)
Exp Total Pay $1.241 (0.070) $1.273 (0.084)
a Pair Rotation: When present, new producer /manager pairs were randomly formed each period within a given
decision series (ten periods). When absent, each producer /manager pair remained together within a given
decision series.
b Experienced Producer: Inexperienced producer decision series (1st ten decision periods as producer) versus
experienced producer decision series (2nd ten decision periods as producer).
c Slack%: Expected production less the producer’s self-set budget all divided by expected production.
d Low Effort%: The percent of time producers provided low effort in a production series.
e Expected Producer Pay: Determined by the budget and effort decisions of the producer (see Table 1).
f Expected Manager Pay: Determined by the budget and effort decisions of the producer (see Table 1).
g Expected Total Pay: Total expected surplus determined by the budget and effort decisions of the producer (see
Table 1).
greater reciprocity as evidenced by the budget and effort outcomes, managers in the rotation
condition were also effective at extracting more than the unconstrained opportunism ex-
pected pay of $0.50. This is because while managers in the rotation condition more strongly
controlled budgetary slack at 35.3 and 34.7 percent, respectively, their producers provided
low effort only 75.0 and 64.6 percent of the time over the two experience conditions (rather
than the opportunistic level of 100 percent low effort).
The lower reciprocity under the pair rotation condition may have been driven, in part,
by a feature of our experimental design. Because producers publicly submitted their pro-
duction budget and privately selected their effort level at the beginning of each decision
period, they selected their effort level before the rejection decision of the manager. If we
only ran a single period, therefore, there would be no possibility of reciprocity. Other
features of our experimental design, however, mitigate this concern. To approximate the
agency assumption of common knowledge, we gave participants extensive experience in
both roles. In particular, participants experienced 20 decision periods as producers during
the experiment. Thus, under pair rotation producers likely based their effort levels on the
average budget levels allowed by the managers in their experimental group. Interestingly,
our results suggest that participants developed a general conviction that low effort should
be reduced in response to the high budgetary slack, even in the no rejection conditions. To
examine the source of this behavior, we include a supplemental analysis of fairness and
ethical concerns below.
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Supplemental Analysis of Fairness and Ethical Concerns
Luft (1997) asserts that fairness and ethical concerns can have a countervailing effect
on opportunistic behavior within the organization. Further, prior experimental studies sug-
gest that these concerns can affect budgetary slack and effort behavior. For example, Stevens
(2002) found that budgetary slack was negatively associated with ethical concerns expressed
by participants in an exit questionnaire and a measure of ethical responsibility from a pre-
experiment personality questionnaire (the Jackson Personality Inventory [JPI-R]; Jackson
1994). Further, Hannan (2005) found that fairness concerns can affect effort, as workers
who were given a higher salary reciprocated by providing higher effort. Thus, we examine
the incremental effects of concerns for fairness and ethics on our public and private forms
of opportunism. We begin by examining simple bivariate correlations and then present
multivariate regression models of budgetary slack and low effort to determine if our fairness
and ethics measures have any explanatory power with the other variables in the model.
At the beginning of each experimental session, participants were given part of the
JPI-R (Jackson 1994) to gather personality measures that might moderate opportunism. In
particular, participants answered 60 true/false questions measuring three of the 15 scales
or dimensions of personality in the JPI-R: cooperativeness, risk taking, and responsibility.
To gather ‘‘situation-specific’’ measures of fairness and ethical concerns, the following two
statements were included in the exit questionnaire. Participants responded to these
two statements on a Likert scale from 1 ‘‘Strongly Disagree’’ to 7 ‘‘Strongly Agree’’:
16. ‘‘While playing the role of the producer, my major concern in selecting my effort
and budget levels was to share the potential earnings with the manager.’’
17. ‘‘While playing the role of the producer, it would have been unethical for me to
provide low effort and a budget significantly below expected production.’’
The cooperativeness and responsibility scales of the JPI-R exhibited little explanatory
power, so are excluded from the analysis. Consistent with prior research linking budgetary
slack to risk aversion, the risk-taking scale exhibited explanatory power for budgetary slack.
The risk-taking scale, which captures an individual’s general proclivity to engage in situ-
ations having uncertain outcomes, generated almost the full range of possible scores (2 to
19 out of a possible 20) with an average score of 11.10 (SD  4.93). The fairness and
ethics statements generated the full range of responses from 1 to 7. On average, however,
participants did not agree with either the fairness statement (mean response 2.67, SD
 2.00) or the ethics statement (mean response 3.12, SD  1.92).8
Table 5 contains bivariate correlations between our fairness and ethics variables and
the other key variables in our study. Each variable includes 192 observations (96 participants
 2 experience conditions) except for the fairness and ethics variables, which include 184
observations (92 participants  2 experience conditions—see footnote 8). The correlations
show that budgetary slack is highly negatively related to fairness concerns at the 0.01 level.
Low effort, in contrast, is highly negatively related to both fairness and ethical concerns at
the 0.01 level. These univariate results suggest that fairness concerns reduced both forms
of opportunism while ethical concerns reduced private opportunism only.
While the two exit questionnaire items capturing fairness and ethical concerns are
positively correlated (p  0.01), they appear to capture different constructs. This is reflected
8 Four of the 96 participants neglected to complete the last page of the exit questionnaire where these two state-
ments appeared, so data analyses related to fairness and ethics concerns are based on responses from 92
participants.
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TABLE 5
Bivariate Correlations for Key Variablesa
n  192 (184 for FAIR and ETH correlations)
Variable SLK LOW REJ ROT EXP RKT FAIR ETH
SLK b 1.00 0.062 0.700 0.077 0.082 0.121 0.300 0.054
0.395 0.000 .291 0.257 0.096 0.000 0.470
LOW c 0.006 1.00 0.052 0.147 0.090 0.037 0.311 0.248
0.938 0.472 0.042 0.213 0.613 0.000 0.001
REJ d 0.714 0.064 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.059 0.309 0.105
0.000 0.376 1.000 1.000 0.415 0.000 0.157
ROT e 0.082 0.154 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.013 0.262 0.028
0.258 0.034 1.00 1.000 0.578 0.000 0.225
EXP f 0.087 0.060 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.230 0.408 1.00 1.00 1.000 1.000 1.000
RKT g 0.086 0.001 0.048 0.016 0.00 1.00 0.108 0.079
0.238 0.992 0.510 0.828 1.00 0.143 0.289
FAIRh 0.331 0.371 0.300 0.211 0.00 0.148 1.00 0.348
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 1.00 0.044 0.000
ETH i 0.010 0.281 0.076 0.031 0.00 0.068 0.405 1.00
0.895 0.000 0.302 0.673 1.00 0.357 0.000
a Pearson correlation statistics are above the diagonal and nonparametric Spearman correlation statistics are
below the diagonal. Two-tailed probabilities appear beneath the correlations.
b Budgetary Slack (SLK): Expected production less the producer’s self-set budget all divided by expected
production.
b Low Effort Percentage (LOW): The percent of time low effort was provided by the producer in a given
decision series.
d Rejection Power (REJ): A dummy variable that is 1 when the manager could reject the budget, and 0 when
rejection power was absent.
e Pair Rotation (ROT): A dummy variable that is 1 when new producer /manager pairs were randomly formed
each period, and 0 when each pair in a decision series remained together.
f Experienced Producer (EXP): A dummy variable that is 1 when the producer had experience as a producer in a
prior decision series, and 0 when the producer was inexperienced.
g Risk-Taking (RKT): General risk propensity measured by the Risk-Taking scale of the JPI-R questionnaire,
which ranges from 0 (risk-averse) to 20 (risk-seeking).
h Fairness (FAIR): Preferences for fairness as measured by the producer’s response to the following question in
the exit questionnaire: ‘‘While playing the role of the producer, my major concern in selecting my effort and
budget levels was to share the potential earnings with the manager.’’ The response ranges from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
i Ethics (ETH): Preferences for ethics as measured by the producer’s response to the following question in the
exit questionnaire: ‘‘While playing the role of the producer, it would have been unethical for me to provide low
effort and a budget significantly below expected production.’’ The response ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree).
in the fact that fairness concerns are highly correlated with the two manipulated variables,
pair rotation and rejection power (p  0.01), whereas ethical concerns are not correlated
with the two manipulated variables. In particular, the fairness concerns variable is highly
positively associated with rejection power and highly negatively associated with pair rota-
tion (p  0.01). Thus, participants were more concerned with the fairness of their budget
and effort decisions when the manager had rejection power and when they faced the same
manager over the entire ten periods of a decision series. Interestingly, these are the
same conditions under which there is an increase in reciprocity behavior, suggesting a link
between fairness concerns and reciprocity behavior.
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TABLE 6
Regression Models of Budgetary Slack and Low Effort Percentage
Variable Beta Std. Error t-stat Two-Tailed Sig.
Panel A: Model of Budgetary Slacka
Constant 94.59 7.132 13.26 0.000
Rejection Power 37.25 7.36 5.06 0.000
Pair Rotation 0.91 6.94 0.13 0.896
Experienced Producer 11.82 6.88 1.72 0.088
Rejection  Rotation 6.51 10.11 0.64 0.521
Rejection  Experience 9.18 9.96 0.92 0.358
Rotation  Experience 4.99 9.74 0.51 0.609
Rejection  Rotation  Experience 1.74 14.08 0.123 0.902
Risk-Taking 0.75 0.36 2.10 0.037
Fairness 2.57 1.09 2.36 0.019
Ethics 0.43 1.02 0.43 0.671
n  184; Adj. R2  0.515
Panel B: Model of Low Effort Percentageb
Constant 109.13 13.21 8.26 0.000
Rejection Power 3.10 10.29 0.30 0.763
Pair Rotation 14.63 9.06 1.62 0.108
Experienced Producer 8.44 9.06 0.93 0.353
Rejection  Rotation 13.04 13.20 0.99 0.325
Rejection  Experience 18.22 13.02 1.40 0.163
Rotation  Experience 14.19 12.71 1.12 0.266
Rejection  Rotation  Experience 13.82 18.36 0.75 0.453
Risk-Taking 0.73 0.47 1.55 0.124
Fairness 4.91 1.44 3.40 0.001
Ethics 2.85 1.33 2.14 0.034
Budgetary Slack 0.26 0.10 2.58 0.011
n  184; Adj. R2  0.132
a Budgetary Slack: Expected production less the producer’s self-set budget all divided by expected production.
b Low Effort Percentage: The percent of time low effort was provided by the producer in a given decision series.
Table 6 contains our regression models of budgetary slack and low effort. This analysis
is useful to test the incremental effects of fairness and ethical concerns with other relevant
variables in the model. Note, however, that this analysis is of limited use in testing the
effects of our manipulations because the coefficients on rotation and rejection in the re-
gression models only capture the portion of these effects that are not mediated by fairness
and/or ethics concerns. The regression models contain the two between-participant varia-
bles (Rejection Power and Pair Rotation), the within-participant variable (Experienced Pro-
ducer), the three two-way interactions, the three-way interaction, the Risk-Taking scale of
the JPI-R, and the questionnaire measures of concerns for Fairness and Ethics. The low
effort model also includes the Budgetary Slack variable to test the incremental effect of
reciprocity on low effort with all of the other variables in the model.
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The model of budgetary slack in Panel A of Table 6 shows that fairness concerns reduce
budgetary slack even with the other variables in the model. The Fairness variable is sig-
nificantly negative at the 0.05 level and the coefficient suggests that the amount of budgetary
slack set by the producer decreased on average by 15.4 percentage points as the response
to the fairness statement rose from 1 to 7. The regression coefficient for the Rejection
Power variable is highly negative at the 0.01 level and suggests that giving the manager
the power to reject the budget reduced budgetary slack on average by 37.3 percentage
points. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics presented previously. The coefficient
on the Experienced Producer dummy variable is significant at the 0.10 level and suggests
that producers increased their average slack by 11.8 percentage points in the experienced
decision series. The Risk-Taking variable is significantly negative at the 0.05 level and the
coefficient suggests that a high scorer on this scale of the JPI-R (a score of 20) built slack
that was 15.0 percentage points lower on average than a low scorer (a score of 0). None
of the interaction terms are significant.
The model of low effort in Panel B of Table 6 shows that both fairness and ethical
concerns reduce low effort with the other variables in the model. The Fairness variable is
highly negative at the 0.01 level and the coefficient suggests that low effort percentage
decreased by 29.5 percentage points on average as the response to the fairness statement
rose from 1 to 7. The Ethics variable is negative at the 0.05 level and the coefficient suggests
that low effort percentage decreased by 17.1 percentage points as the response to the ethics
statement rose from 1 to 7. Two results in the model of low effort reflect the reciprocity
strategy we document under rejection power. First, the Budgetary Slack variable is highly
negative at almost the 0.01 level and the coefficient suggests that a producer who set
budgetary slack at 100 percent reduced his/her low effort by 26.0 percentage points on
average compared to a producer who set no budgetary slack. Further, the Pair Rotation
variable is significantly positive at almost the one-tailed 0.05 level and the coefficient sug-
gests that keeping the producer/manager pairs together each period decreased low effort
by 14.6 percentage points on average.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Prior studies of participative budgeting within large divisional organizations suggest
that budgetary slack can be a public form of opportunism (Onsi 1973; Merchant 1989).
Based on this evidence and insights from principal-agent models (Demski and Feltham
1978; Baiman and Evans 1983; Penno 1984), we design a participative budgeting experi-
ment to study public and private forms of opportunism within the organization. Our results
suggest that public and private forms of opportunism may differ systematically and interact
in ways that improve organizational performance. When the producer unilaterally sets the
budget, the public opportunism of budgetary slack is higher and more affected by learning
than the private opportunism of low effort. When the manager has the power to reject the
budget, however, reciprocity expectations and behavior arise whereby managers who allow
more budgetary slack expect and receive higher effort from their producers. This reciprocity,
which is more prevalent when producer/manager pairs stay together over multiple periods,
increases organizational performance by increasing the expected pay of the manager without
decreasing the expected pay of the producer.
Our study contributes to the growing body of experimental work examining the limits
of the unconstrained opportunism assumption in agency theory. Our result that budgetary
slack increased with experience supports the speculation by Stevens (2002) and others that
low levels of budgetary slack found in early experiments using slack-inducing pay schemes
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(e.g., Waller 1988; Chow et al. 1988; Chow et al. 1991) are attributable to insufficient
experience with the economic incentive. In our experiment, however, participants experi-
enced significant levels of slack in their role as manager. Thus, the learning effect we
document for budgetary slack appears to have been driven by both incentive learning and
social learning. Consistent with increasing evidence from game theory experiments, how-
ever, our participants constrain their opportunism to achieve fair outcomes. Similar to
Hannan (2005), the reciprocity expectations and behavior that arise endogenously within
our principal-agent setting improve organizational performance.
Our study also contributes to the vast literature in participative budgeting. First, our
results suggest that budgetary slack may motivate high effort. This is consistent with
Merchant’s (1989) finding that profit center managers were granted budgetary slack as a
reward and that superior performers had higher budgetary slack. Second, our results provide
useful insights regarding the ‘‘uncertainty paradox’’ (Hartmann 2000). Uncertainty hinders
effective budget setting and performance evaluation, and the controllability principle sug-
gests that managers should not be held responsible for performance that is susceptible to
uncontrollable factors (Atkinson et al. 1997). Thus, budget controls appear to be least
feasible or appropriate where they are needed most—in highly uncertain environments
(Emmanuel et al. 1990). Our results suggest that participative budgeting may be optimal
in highly uncertain environments where effort is highly valued by the organization. In such
settings, the potential dysfunctional effects of budgetary slack are likely to be less of a
concern than the motivational effects. This may explain the frequent use of participative
budgeting in highly uncertain organizational settings (Hartmann 2000).
In a supplemental analysis of fairness and ethical concerns, we find that fairness con-
cerns reduce both budgetary slack and low effort. This contributes to the growing body of
evidence for fairness concerns in accounting experiments (Lindquist 1995; Luft and Libby
1997; Libby 2001; Kachelmeier and Towry 2002). We also find that ethical concerns reduce
low effort but not budgetary slack. Our result that ethical concerns do not reduce budgetary
slack appears inconsistent with results reported in Stevens (2002). In his experiment, how-
ever, Stevens used an experimenter manager and kept participants from observing each
other’s budget levels. Thus, budgetary slack in Stevens’ experiment was a private form of
opportunism. In this sense, our finding that ethical concerns reduce the private opportunism
of low effort is consistent with his result. Our insignificant finding for ethical concerns on
budgetary slack also suggests that experiencing high budgetary slack may diminish ethical
concerns, perhaps by forming a social norm for such behavior. The fairness and ethics
results reported here, however, must be interpreted with care as they are based on two
questions in the exit questionnaire.
In a related study, Rankin et al. (2006) find that giving the superior final budget au-
thority diminishes the effect of honesty preferences on budgetary slack. They conclude that
when superiors have final budget authority, subordinates are motivated more by strategic
concerns than ethical concerns. Hobson et al. (2007) also find that participants given a
truth-inducing pay scheme are less likely to judge significant budgetary slack to be unethical
than participants given a slack-inducing pay scheme. These results open the possibility that
control systems and economic incentives that induce agents to ‘‘do the right thing’’ may
diminish ethical concerns by changing the script from a moral script to an economic script.
In contrast to Rankin et al. (2006), our measure of ethical concerns is not affected by our
rejection power manipulation. The possibility that control systems and economic incentives
may diminish ethical concerns in some circumstances, however, appears to be a fertile area
for future research.
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